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-by-
Andrewv Lee Olmsted,
Cornell University School of Lawv,
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V. Conclusion.
A history of corporations would be a his
tory of the industrial -rogress of the last century.
Created by the people for their own purposes their
chronicle is but a chronicle of the times. To us
they are prime necessities. They have grown up,
under our customs and economics; they have been
moulded by our constitutional and statutory laws,
our judicial decisions and our public sentiment, and
they have filled, from time to time, just such
places in our social, educational, and business
lives, as our progress has made desirable.
In the discussion of their relations to
the government, I am not unconcious of the embar-
assments under which I labor. These embarassments
are inherent in the very nature of the subject.
The unsettled condition of the law of corporations,
the complications of business enterprise, the con-
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servatism of courts in attompting to apply old
and inelastic rules to the neCw and ever varying
situations which the fertile ingenuity of American
business men are constantly devising, the activity
of legislatures in molding statutesfor their regula-
tion, and the utterly holleless condition of text
writers, all tend to render a discussion of any
branch of the law of corporations an arduous task.
Private corporations had been a part of
the conmon law of England long before the settle-
ment of this continent. No doubt the theory was
carried over with the body of the civil law by the
Roman legions at the conquest of Britain. Black-
stone attributes the origin of corporations to the
Romans. Plutrarch mentions that Numa Pompilius
divided the Romans and Sabines into different cor-
porations in order to suppress the turbulence of
contending tribes. It is probable though, that
what Plutrarch termed"corporationst, were what we
call usocieties,'. The Pandects favor the idea
that the Romans were indebted to the Greeks for the
-3-
idea of corporations4
A few great corporations had been formed
before we were a nation; such as the Russian Company
in the reign of Edward IV.; the East Land Company
in 1579; the East India Company in 1600; and the
Hudson's Bay Company in 1070. On the continent
peculiar privileges to individuals have always been
grudgingly granted. In England, while they were
freely granted to royal favorites, still, corpor-
ations for purposes of trade have nat been accorded
the unqualified privileges and rights which have
been bestowed in this country. In no other age or
country have corporations played so impottant a
part in social and industrial development as with
us.
Many thingd tended to retard the immediate
growth of corporations among the early settlers of
this country. They were poor, the Indian wars
harassed and impeded them, and the p olicy of the
mother country was to dwarf the commerce and manu-
factures of the colonies. The character of the
settlers who had come here either for plunder or
refuge, was unsuited to build up coirnerciai enter-
prises. All this prepares us for that remarkable
fact that, during the whole colonial period,not
ond body politic of the nature of which we speak
was created. (Paper read by Andrew Al lson, before
American Bar Association, 1884.) During the Revol-
ution and up to the adoption of the constitution the
country was to unsettled for corporate life. in
the Constitutional Convontion it was a debatable
question whether the state or the national govern-
ment should have the granting of franchises. The
action of the convention created afterward great
embarassment in the courts, especially in contests
over the United States Bank. The growth of cor-
poration: from this time was marvelous. They were
chartered with great liberality and in a short time
were occupyimg a considerable field in manufactur-
ing and business enterprises. Even at this early
day people began to look upon corporate encroach-
ments with apprehension. In the case of Ellis v.
-4-
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Marshall, in 1807 (2 Mass.., 208) we find the
Attorney General using the foliowing remarkable
language - "The increase of corporations for almost
every purpose is seriously alarming. A spirit is
growing in the country which will be productive of
the most :'!!so-_icvols, effects. Interested and cor-
rupt motives are growing daily more prevalent from
this source. The independance and integrity of
every branch of our government are attempted and it
is time that a check be put to this spirit. And
to an independent and enlightened judiciary alone
can we look for its application.,,
The war of 1012, soon followed and for
the time stopped the growth of corporations, but
the naval victoriee of that war aroused the pride of
the country in our merchant marine, and its result
was to greatly increase commercial activity i
business enterprise. The country was fast recover-
ing from the war and regaining ite commercial im-
portance when in 1819 the Supreme Court made one of
the most remakable descisions in history, It is
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not toomuch to say that it came with surrprisc to
the court, the bar, and the country. Of course I
refer to the Dartmouth College case. To state the
facts upon which the case arose would be a mere
repetition of a common learning in the law and is
therefore ornmitted as well as the circumstances of
the trial for which reference is -lade to the work
of Mr. Shirley on the history of the case,"(Thc
Dartmouth Causes and the Supreme Court of the United
States, St. Louis, 1879.)1 A.strict statement of
the decision is, that the charters of private cor-
porations are contracts betwven the legislature and
the co'rporation, having for their consideration the
duties which the corporations assume by acceptirZ
them, and the grant of the franchise caiL ,o more be
resumed by the legislature, or its benefits 'diminish-
ed or impaired, without the consent of the grantees,
than any other g-ant of property or other valuable
thing unless the right to do so is reserved in the
charter itself.
-7-
Says Chancellor Kent (1 Kent' s Comm. ,410)
"It contains one of the most full and elaborate ex-
positions of the constitiutional sanctity of con-
tracts to be met with in any of the resorts. The
decision in that case did more than any other single
act proceeding from the authority of the United
States, to throw an impregnable barrier around all
rights and franchises derived from the grant of
governent, to give solidity and inviolabilty to
the literary, charitable, religious, and commercial
institutions of our country. ,
Another learned co=,entator, Mr. Justice
Cooley, writing nearly fifty years later, adds to
a statement of the doctrine established in that case
the following;-"It is under the protection of the
decision in the Dartmouth Colloge Case that the
most enormous and threatening powers in our country
have bee 3. oato, some of the more wealthy corpor-
ations having more influence in the country at
large than the states to which they owe their cor-
porate existance. Every privilege granted or right
-8-
conferred, no matter by what means or on what pre-
tense, being made inviolable by the constitution,
the government id frequently found stripped of its
authority in very important particulars by unwise,
careless, or corrupt legislation, and a clause in
the federal constitution, whose purpose was to
preclude the repudiation of debts and just contracts,
protects and perpetuates the evil.,'
These contrasted statements of the effects
of this decision present a most interesting inquiry,
which, however, the sco!c of this article compels
me to briefly dispose of.
First let us look at the apclication of
the rule.
1. All grants of property by the legis-
lature to corporations have been held to carry an
absolute title which cannot afterward be resumed
by or controlled by the legislature any more than
an absolute grant made to individuals. Upon this
no authority need be given. It is settled by in-
numerable cases.
-0-
2. The same principle has, by repeated
adjudications, been held to apply to grants of
franchises to corporations. This is the chief
advantage accruing to corporations from the cIecision.
By the bestowal of such franchises there are con-
ferred upon corporate and associated capital powers
which individuals-camnot have. Powers for good
certainly, but also powers for evil, which have been
exercised to such public detriment that the people
have been stirred to their depths by the urgent
necessity of finding a remedy, some effectual means
of restraint upon corporate abuses.
3. The decision has a1do been of great
value to corporations in the protection of special
privileges granted to corporations in the use and
enjoyment of their franchises. Corporations there-
by become possessed of the power to determine,
without restriction or legislative control, the
compensation they shall receive for their services.
The authorities to this effect ivere uniform until
the comparitively recent cases in the Supreme Court
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as to the regulation of corporate business which
will be considered later. (Penn. R.R. v.Sly, 65 Pa.
St. ,205; P.W & B.R.R.Co., v. Bowers,4 -Houst.,506;
Hamilton v. Keith, 5 Bush.,(Ky) 458.)
4. The exemption of a private corporation
from taxation altogether, and taxation at srecial
and favorable rates under charter provisions has
been of such advantage to them that, more than any
other of their privileges, perhaps, these have en-
countered the disapproval and opposition of the
people and the bar. The principle that the legis-
lature cannot impair a grant of exemption from tax-
ation does not rest its origin upon the Dartmouth
College Case. It found its earliest assertion in
the case of New Jersey v. Wilson, in 1812, (7 Cranch,
164.) and the succeeding cases which affirm the rule
profess to rest upon that case. (Murray v. Charles-
ton, 96 U.S. ,432) The decision was, that under
the constitution of total or partial exemption from
taxation was a contract which could not be rep-eal-
ed. Whether or not this case was properly decided,
11--
it was by virtue of the bartraouth College Case that
the rule was extendod to apply to private cori or-
ations. it is, however, the present tendency of
the court to hold that the taxing-power is an at-
tribute of sovereignty which cannot be granted away
by the state. At any rate it is the settled rule
in the United States and New York courts that ex-
emptions from taxation must be expressed in the
clearest and unambiguous language, andAnot to be
left to implication or inference. (R.R.Co. v. Den-
nis, 116 U.S.,665; People v. Davenport, 91 N.Y.574;
People v. Cook, 14 Sp. Ct.Rep. 649. ) Exemptions
from taxation will be discussed further on.
Here than are the cstabllshed results of
this decision,-complete protect'on of corporate
rights and franchises, the title an'd use of corpor-
ate property, irmunities and exemptions from taxa-
tion, and all these safe from any alteration or
impairment of the rights and proprietary conditions
secured by their charters.,'
The doctrine has, however, several impor-
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tant limitations..
1. It has been laid down in inn;'merable
cases th.t all legislative grants will be strictly
construed against the corporation. Charters con-
vey nothing by implication. (Charles River Bridge
Company, v. Warren Bridge Co., l1 Peters 420)
2. The legislature has no authority to
bind the people by any contract which affects their
health or morals. So a grant of a privilege to
conduct a lottery was held to be revocable. (Phalen
v. Virginia, 8How.,1C3; 101 U.S.,814) So also an
exclusive grant infcorporating a company to maintain
a slaughter house at a certain point may be repealed
or altered. (Butchers Union Co. v. Crecent City Co.,
111 U.S. ,746; Putnam v. Ruch, 54 Fed. ,210.)
3. The legislature may exercise the power
of eminent domain to authorise the taking of the
property of corporations, including their franchises
on payment of compensation. Thebasis of the
inviolability of grants to corporations being the
same as in Srants to individualsof course corpor-
-13-
ations obtain no greater rights than individuals
have. ( c-Wj Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Lir';t Co.
115 U.S.,650; Greenwood v. The Frei" 4 (o., 7+-5 U.S.,
22.)
4. It may no : be taken as s c1cI , though
after.a long ahd bitter controversy, and with very
able dissenting opinions, that the state may, in
the exercise of its police power, interfere and
control the conduct and business practicesW, in-
cluding charges, of certain quasi-public corporatiorE.
The leading cases upon this are, (a) The "Jarff-7-sC
Cases which held valid a Ia; fixins the maximrum of
charges for the storage of grain in warehouses and
requiring persons doing business as warehousemen to
take out lioenses for such business. (Muhnn v. Ill.,
94 U.S.,lI3) (b) The Granger Cases which held
tgat the legislature may in the absence of charter
contracts to the contrary, fix the maximum rates of
fare and fret.ght of railroad compLanies within the
state.&)The Railroad Commission Cases (116 U.S.,307)
affirm the granSger Cases and hold that the creation
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of a state board to regulate the rates of transpor-
tation and supervise the c~nduct of railroads doe,-
not violate the charter right of a corporation to.
manage its own affairs through its own directors,
that statutes regulating rates of charges do not
deprive corporationd of property without due pro-
cessof law. The power of regulation id decla.red to
be one which cannot be bargained away without
express grant.
These cases have aroused great criticism
in the legal profession. Much has been said and
written upon them and it cannot be doubted that as
a matter of sound law and judicial precedence based
upon the Dartmouth College Case, they were wrongly
decided. They represent the strong reaction against
corporations produced by ah earlier over-indulgence.
It is but the swing of the pendulum . However
great the integrity of the court, it is plain that
it felt the influence of the strong public sentiment
which prevailed at the time. And as a matter of
sound public policy the decisions were probably good
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unless they shall be so construed as to place the
property rights of individuals wholly within the
legislative control and thtis impair individual lib-
erty. The present attitude of the courts upon the
question assures us that there is no danger of that.
The basis of these decision is the nature
of the business; while the courts have declared that
they are not inconsistent with the Dartmouth College
Case, it cannot be doubted that they reT.osonl
great and sweeping limitations upon it. They
practically exempt from its operation all that
large class of corporations whose business is or
may be deemed to be affected with 4,e public use.
Among those who criticise7 College decision, these
rulings are hailed as presaging its being finally
overruled. But grave and clearseeing people main-
tain, and with good reason, that the doctrine has
become to firmly fixed to be eradicated, even if it
were desiable, and that upon its facts the case
must stand as an established rule of law never to
be questioned.
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S. Tle Surpreme Court has uphold and aser-
ted the legislative authority over corporations in
all cases where their charters, or general laws,
or the provision of state condtitutions.reserve to
the state legislatures the rower of amendment and
repeal, It was no doubt with a view to suggest a
method by which state legislatures could retain in
a large measure this inm-portant Tower without viol-
ating the provis-ions of the federal constitution,
that lh.Justice Story in the Dartmouth College Case,
suggested that a reservation to amend or repeal
would have that effect. it would seem that the
states were not slow to avail themselves of this
suggestion. in many states it soon became the
custom to reserve a right of alteration and repeal
in the charter, which at that early day were usually
granted by a special act of the legislature, and it
was uniformly that, the reservation being a part of
tho ccxtract, the charter might be repealed or al-
tered inaccordance with it without impairing the
obli ;t o of the contract. In New York the
prevision was incorporated into the general laws in
1830, and the example was raidly followed by sev-
eral states. Constitutional provisions to the
effect that all general laws for the creation of
cotporations may be amended or repealed have been
enacted in twenty states. Also in twelve states a
constitution provides that all charters or special
acts may be repealed or altered. In Texas "all
privileges and franchises are subject to control."
But in Arizona "no corpooration can be dissolved or
its rights impaired except by judicial proceedings."
And in Iowa laws creating corporations can be alter-
ed or rerea1ed only upon a tvwo-L:.lrds vote of each
house of the legislature than present. In Michigan
they cannot be altered or amended without a vote of
two-thirds of each "ouse elected. In several
states the constitution also provides that the
charter of a corporation cannot be so altered or
repealed as"to destroy vested rights,"or,'in such
manner as to vork injustice to the corpforators or
corporation creditors." It has bccn repeatedly held
-18-
that such legislative or constitutional proViSiOns
are to be read into each charter granted and that
they are a part of the contract.
In New York owing to the late revision
of the corporation law.s,a curious and interesting
question has arisen. After the decision in 1810,
it became customary, in granting charters to corpor-
ations by special actto mae the reservation to
amend and repeal.a part of the charter contract.
When the first revision of the general laws took
place this clause was inserted into the general
corporation laws, and became operative from that
time. (1 R.S.,800 sec.,8)(1830) 'The charter of
every corporation that shall hereafter br granted
shall be subject to alteration, amendment, and re-
peal in the discussion of the legislature., The
constitution of 1847, contains this provision
(Article VIII. Sec. ,1. ) "Corporations may be formed
under general laws, but shall not be created by
slecial act except for munidipal purposes and in
cases, where, in the judgment of the legislature, its
-19-
objects cannot be obtainea under general laws.
All general laws and special acts passed piursuant
to this section may be altered from time to time or
repealed.1" The Railroad law of 1850 as amended in
1867 also contains the clause. By the revision of
I890 the old corporation laws were repealed and
the clause was not inserted in the new corporation
law of that year, the revisers thinking that the
clause in the constitution took c-re of the matter.
It will be seen however, that the clause in the con-
stitution is limited by the words "pursuant to this-
section" so that it does not applt to corporations
formed prior to 1847. Now the law under which
those corporations were formed having been amended,
and the reservation to repeal, which,prior to 1890,
was read into their charter contract, having been
wiped out, are those corporations still suibject to
the legislative control in accordance with their
original contract, or have their charters become
absolute 3nd inviolable contracts within the Dart-
mouth College Case? It would seem that they have
-20-
How can a provision of a general law be read into
a charter when it no longer exists? The only
ground on which an argument in favor of the state
can be based is to maintain that the corporations
are bound by their original contract and that the
state may act in accordance therewith. To this
comes, as it seems to me,the tnanswerable argument
that their'original contract was not an absolute
one. Not only did the state reserve the right to
repeal but also to amend. The revisers have been
careful to so enact the laws that they stand upon
the statute books as amendments to the ald lavs,
although substantially and different. The revision
is therefore an amendment in accordance with the
reserved option and the legislature having so
.amended" the original contract has made it absolute.
In the very exercise of the reserved right the
state has lost it and it cannot be heard tD say
that it revokes its waver, for the wayer was not
upon condition, and is therefore absolute. There
may however be standing room for argument upon the
-21-
other side. The question is debatable and will
not be settled until the courts have passed upon it.
I desire merely to point out the question and indi-
cate the argument. The effect of this slip in
legislation remains to beseen. The period between
1830 and 1847 was a time of great advancement 62d
commercial activity, and during that period many
corporations were formed. It is to be noted how-
ever, that many corporations were even then created
by special act, and in the great majority of such
cases the clause w7Ls put in the charter. The
question will be most likely to arise if the state
repeals some exemptions from taxation granted to
corporations during that time. In such case it --is
to be doubted if the courts would hold strictly to
the rule in the Dartmouth College Case and whether
they would not hold that the taxing po-:er is an
attribute of sovereignty which cannot be absolutely
and irretrievably granted away, and thereby sustain
the legislation. Space will not permit af a fuller
discussion of the matter and here we are obliged to
leave it.
Scope of the Reserved Right of Alteration and Repeal.
Amendment.- Whenever the power is re-
served it may be exercised to almost any extent to
carry into effect the original purposes of the cor-
porate organization and secure the administration
of its affairs. But corporations cannot be deprived
of their rights or property acquired by the use
of their franctises. The rights of creditors and
share-holders are protected* The amendment must
be made in good faith; under its guise orPresion
must not be worked. The polaer has its limits and
cannot be used to take property already acquired
under the operation of the charter or to deprive
the corporation of the fruits of contracts lawfully
made and actually reduced to possession. A case
of great hardship under the rule is that of Spring
Valley '7ater Works Co. V. Schlotter, (110 U.S,.348).
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That corporation had expended vast sums of money to
collect water artifically in the mountains and
conveym to San Francisco a supply of pure water
for the city and its inhabitants. The charter
provided that the water rates should be fixed by
a board of disinterested appraisers. Under the
resetved power of ramendinent,; the people of Califor-
M-aby a constitutionl amendment changeo the moae
of valuation, leaving the entire matter to the city
officials, the city itself being the largestconsum-
er of water. The court held that the amendment
was clearly authorised under the reservation stated.
To this decision however, there are strong dissent-
ing opinions by some of the most able judges of the
court. They maintain that the right to alter or
repeal extends only to franchises and immunities
derived directly from the state and that right@ and
interests acquired by the corporation not consti-
tuting a part of the original contract are inviolable
and cannot be taken without due process of law.
"The object of a reservation of this kind
-24-
in acts of incorporation is to insure to the govern-
ment, control over corporate franchises, rights, and
privileges, which in its sovereign or legislative
capacity it may call into existance; not to inter-
fere with contracts which the corporation created
by it may nake. (Sinking Fund Cscs, 09 U.S. 700.)
Repeal.- It has been decided upon in-
numerable occasions and is now generally conceded
that where the legislature has rese:'ved to itself
the unlimited and ubconditional power to repeal
corporate charters, it may exercise such power un-
trarmeled by judicial interference. There are a
few cases to the contrary ind the toxt-vriters are
somewhat at sea upon the questlion, but the cases
cited in sup-:ort of a contrary doctrine will usually
be found to be cases where the reservation was a
conditional one, With - sufficiency or justice of
the reasons which actuated the legislature, under
such circumstances, in making such repeals, the
judiciary have n6 concern, it is purely a question
of expediency which it is beyond the power of the
courts to inquire into. Where however, the legis-
lature in its repealing act assumes to dispose of
its corporate property, the act is unconstitutional
as depriving the stock-holders and creditors of prop-
erty without due process of law.
Where however, the legislature has not
reserved to itself the unlimited and uncontrol'ld
power to repeal a corporate charter, either by an
express provision ih the charter, or by a general
law, and a grant of corporate privileges has been
made, subject to the conditional right of the legis-
lature to repeal the same upon the happening of
some event, such as the failure of the corporation
to go into existance, or the abuse of its privileges,
a different and more difficult question is pre-
sented upon which the authorities are in direct
conflict. It is urged upon he one hand that the
investigation and determination of the question,
whether the occasion has arrived upon which the re-
served power of the legislature can act, is one of
judicial and not of legislative cognizance and that
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any action of the legislature prior to such judic-
ial determination would be in excess of its powers,
and an encroach ent upon the authority of the ju-
diciary. (Flint ect. Plank Road Co. v. Wloohull,25
Mich.,99; State v. Noyes, 47 Me.,189; Regents v.
Williams, 9 Gill & J.,122.) On the other hand
it is said that the conditional reservation of the
charter becomes binding upon the corporation as
soon as the same is accepted and that the corporation
is estopped to question the power of the legislature
to determine the happening of tge contingency al-
though such question is judicial in its nature.
(Crease v. Babcock, 23 Pick. ,334; Lothrop v. Sted-
man 42 Conn., 584)
T am reluctant to enter upon this field
of enquiry, for I am satisfied that no rule can be
laid down which does not contain a germ of mischief,
no hard and fast rule can be made which ,il decide
all cases without injustice. it scems though,
that the justice and roason of the question are
withthose courts holding that the legislature has
-27-
no power to declare that the event upon which its
action was conditioner has happened. in such cases
there are necessarilly a verse :arties, the quest-
ions which arise are essentially judicial, ad the
determination as to whether one party to a contract
has performed his duties under it ought not to be
placed in the hands of the other party to the con-
tract. It requires the action of those trubunals
which must hear before they condemin and rocecd
upon inquiry.. The violation of a charter or the
happening of an trent upon which corporate life is
conditioned, cannot be raade to aipoar except upon
trial in a tribunal whose course of ::rocoeding is
devised fot the determination of questions of 1. 1
nature. On the other hand it has been said that
the courts ae coJ27c1deie to presume on account of
the courtesy and confidence which is due from one
department of the government to another, that t1y
contingency has happened uron vwhich alone the leg-
islature could act. (DeCamp v. Eveland, 19 Barb. )
The question only arises ina very few states at the
'
present time and they,,unanimously hold that the
legislature cannot perform judicial acts.
Distribution of Assets upon Rereal.
Upon the "issolution of a c-ry-oration by
whatever manner the corporate assetts of every 1:ind
after the payment of corporate debts belong to the
shareholders and are to be distributed among them
proportionally according to the number of their
shares. .At co=n-on law upon the dissolution of a
corporation, its debts were extinguished, its real
estate reverted to the grantor, and its ersonalty
escheated to the sovereign. This rule arose when
private corporations for businees purposes were
comparatively uranown, and it had its origin in the
disposition to limit the accumulation in the hands
of the' church. Notwithstanding some statements
by text writers to the contrary it is to be doubted
if this rule was ever held to apply to private bus-
iness cor~oraticns except in one or two isolated ra
cases. One of these cases is to be found in the
-29-
first volume of Ill. Reports. But in the . early
case of Bacon v. Robertscn,(18 Hovw.,480) the Supreme
Court refused to almply the rule. The sehtence of
forfeiture whether pronounced by court or legislature
does not forfeit the rights of property in the stock-
holders. In many states the rule is however,
expressly abrogated by statute. In New York it was
abrogated by the Revised Lavis of 1813. (1 Rev.Laws,
248.) was made a part of the Revised Statutes of
1830 and stands upon the statute books to-day. It
provides that upon the dissolution of a corporation
its directors, unless other persons shall be ap-
pointed by the legislature or by some court of com-
petent jurisdiction, shall be the trustees for the
creditors, stockholders or members to settle up the
affairs of the corporation collect and pay outstand-
ing debts and to distribute its ass±tr assetts,
after payment of the debts among the persons en-
titled thereto.(General Corp. Law,1802,sec.30.)
Under this, debts due to and from the corporation
may be collected.
-30-
At common law actions by and against the
corporation abated upon dissolution. This has
been altered in many states by statute. in New
York the dissolution of a corporation terminates an
action then pending against it and all subsequent
proceedings therein are void unless the action be
continued by an order of a court. This can only
be done in pursuance of a statute to that effect.
Such a statute was enacted in New York in 1832,
Chap. 295, which provided that upon a dissolution
of a corporation suite pending in its favor should
not be abated but should be continued by a receiver
to be appointed, or by its legal trustees in the
name of the corporation or in the names of such
receivers ottrustees substituted as plaintiffs. It
also provided (sec. 4) for the continuance of any
suit pending at the time of dissolution might be
continued on the application of either party, and
that the final judgment should be of the same effect
as if the corporation had not been dissolved. This
act was repealed by Chap. 245, Laws of 1880, part
of it being incoryorated in the Civil Code. Sect.
4 was not reenacted and it vwould som that the com-
mon law rule still holds d good. Creditors how-
ever, have their remedy against the receivers or
trustees. Vether p.ersons who have h chases in
action for tort against the corporation are "cred-
itors" within the statute is a question which I
leave unsettled. It has not yet been passed upon
by our Court of Ap-peals. For a full discussion of
the subject I desire to refer to "The Death of Pri-
vate Corporations Having Capital Stock," a grad-
uating thesis by Gee. A. NalClass of '02, Cornell
University School of Law. Citing (Grafton v. Union
Ferry Co. 13 Sup., 878.- 16 Sup.,692.) After a
careful study,notwithstanding that the only case in
this state vas decided against him, he arrives at
this conclusion. " Persons having claims against
corporations on grounds of tort are not creditors
until their claims are in judgment, and the damages
ascertained decisions to the contrary notwithstand-
ing." I am inclined to accept Nall's reasoning.
The old common law rule as to the rever-
sion of real estate to the grantor, and the escheat
of its personalty to the sovereign has been applied
in some recent decisions relative to Railroad &
Canal Companies, and eleemosynary corporations,
with slight modifications. In Mott v. Danville
Seminary,( 120 Ill. ,403) it was held that the real
property owned by a theological seminary having no
dc'b! reeoveted on dissolution to its grantors.
In New York, land taken for public park and canal
purpfoses reverts to the state. (iRexford v. Knight,
IlN.Y.,284) And in the recent case of the Mormon
Church (136 U.S. ,1. ) it was held uon itd dissolution
that its property would not revert to the donors
for they could not be found but that it reverted to
the state which -moxix might by legislation inter ose
and direct its distribution to lawfiul charitable
ends, coincident as far as may be with the objects
originally proposed. This case represents the
utmost stretch of legislative power, and was decided
by a divided court,(FullerField and L=ar dissenting.
-3,3-
The conflict of o:Ainion which has prevail-
ed as to the effect of a forfeiture upon corporate
franchises and property has been determined in a
recent case in New Yorh.(Peo)ie v. O.3rien,llN.Y.,I)
The points settled by the Court of Appeals are:
1. The Franchises of a corp.-oration (other
than the franchise to be a corporation and to act in
the future) and its contracts made in the exerciso
thereof, survive the legislative or judicial
forfeiture of its charter unless provisions for
compensation be made: for the reserved power of re-
peal, which now ap-lics to charters generally, is
subject to the constitutional prohibitions against
impairing the obligation of ...... a ti
private property without compensation.
2. Theither an oyress liriitation in the
charter of the corporate life by a specifie -eriod,
nor the constitutional or statutory -ojor to r e eal
charters, constitutes any limitation on the perm&nent
or absolute character of a r_ nt to a c'Drporation-
such as a grant by a municipal corporation to a
-S $-
street railroad company of the right to run and
construct their road. Such a franchise is not
merely a licensy but is property of a transferablO
nature and cannot be destroyed by a re- eal or for-
feiture of the charter of the corporation.
3. The franchiseswhich are purely person-
al and incorporeal--such as comtinued corporate
existence and the continue. exercise of corrorate
-powers, necessarially expire with the oxtinction of
corporate life, unless special provision is otherwise
made; but the riL-oht to roi-' held, and the val-
idity of contracts mare in virtue of those fran-
chises do not expirc with the extinction of corpor-
ate life.
This case again affirms the adherence of
the court tolthe Dartmouth Collcge Case. t would
seem that tho rule laid down will be a::lied to alL
grants by the state unless the right of amendment
or reeal is expressly reserved.
t4 iAA-
IIalp tdon the courts leave us. There is
yet rauch uncertainty and aPprehension. The scepter
of 1019 has been bro::en by popular sentiment. No
thoughtfu1 person can contemi.1ate the difficulties
attending a correct solition of those proble,s yet
unsolved without some a;ehension. Yet it must be
a source of gratification to every true lavirer to
look back over our juridicial history, and see the
opinion of the grzE.t chief justice survive the
overthrow of r- artios, the varying policies of men,
of the states, and of the nation, and the sharp at-
tack of aodverse criticism, affirmed times without
number,thrcugh two generations of menby his suc-
cessors w7ho nave beon da::n from every political
faith. There is not an crinion from Wheaton down
to date where contract rights under charters are
involved, vhich does not declare that the rule of
lay announced is but the s-pirit of the original
Collce decision. The p-pinciple has been so long
imbedded in the jurLs-iidence of the country that
it is to all intents and prpor:;ses a -.art of the
Const itution.
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